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Abstract 
The present article investigates the conditions under which vengeful episodes are satisfactory 
for the victim/avenger. Two hypotheses are tested simultaneously: (1) Victims are satisfied if 
they see the offender suffer, even if this suffering was imposed by fate (“comparative 
suffering” hypothesis); (2) Victims are satisfied if the offender signals that he understands 
why revenge was imposed upon him (“understanding” hypothesis). A laboratory experiment 
is described in which the source of the offender’s suffering (revenge vs. fate) and the 
offender’s understanding for the cause of his suffering were varied. As an implicit measure of 
goal fulfillment, participants completed a lexical decision task that measured the relative 
accessibility of aggression-related words (compared to non-aggressive words). The results 
corroborate the understanding hypothesis: Participants showed higher levels of implicit goal 
fulfillment if they decided to take revenge and if the offender signaled understanding for the 
vengeful response. The findings are discussed with regard to the question what people hope to 
achieve when they take revenge. 
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What Makes Revenge Satisfactory: 
Seeing the Offender Suffer or Delivering a Message? 
Revenge is a personal response to unjust treatment. Its goal is to achieve some sort of 
payback, to get even with the villain, to make the offender get what he or she deserves. But 
what exactly is it that needs to be got even? Many scholars agree that revenge implies a 
retributive principle: The quantity and quality of the revenge should be approximately 
proportional to the amount of harm implied in the original offense. Proportionality is a key 
feature and even a norm of revenge (Bies & Tripp, 1996; McLean Parks, 1997; Tripp & Bies, 
1997). Revenge should fit the original offense − both in quantity and quality (Crombag, 
Rassin, & Horselenberg, 2003; Tripp, Bies, & Aquino, 2002). If revenge is proportional, it 
restores equity (Skarlicki & Folger, 1997; Walster, Walster, & Berscheid, 1978) and puts the 
world back into balance. But what exactly needs to be balanced in order to make revenge 
satisfactory? 
Some authors (e.g., Frijda, 1994; Heider, 1958) argue that it is the amount of pain that 
needs to be balanced between the avenger and the offender. The offense caused an affective 
imbalance between the offender and the victim, and so revenge might aim at redressing this 
imbalance by making the offender suffer himself. According to Frijda (1994), the “sense of 
justice derive from reflection upon comparative suffering“ (p. 274). This “comparative 
suffering” hypothesis has an interesting and empirically testable implication: If it is merely 
the amount of suffering that needs to be equalized in order to restore justice, then it should 
make no difference whether this suffering is administered by the avenger himself (through 
revenge), by a third person (e.g., through a legal sanction), or by fate (through accidental 
harm). 
An alternative answer to the question what makes revenge satisfactory is based on the 
notion that revenge aims at delivering a message to the offender and to make him understand 
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that what he or she did was morally reprehensible (French, 2001). According to this 
“understanding hypothesis”, revenge is only satisfactory if the offender acknowledges that 
revenge was taken against him because and in virtue of his prior unfair behavior (M. 
Gollwitzer, in press; Miller, 2001; Vidmar, 2001). 
Empirically, it appears that the understanding hypothesis received more support than the 
comparative suffering hypothesis (M. Gollwitzer, Kriesch, & Schmitt, 2008). In one of these 
experiments, participants were confronted with a very egoistic (ostensible) partner. 
Participants were given the opportunity to take revenge by deducting lottery tickets from their 
partner. Subsequently, participants could chat with their partner via computer. The message 
they received from their ostensible partner was experimentally manipulated. In one condition, 
the partner understood that taking tickets would be a punishment for his prior unfair behavior. 
In another condition, the partner stated that he would not understand that tickets were 
deducted from him. Participants experienced less anger, more satisfaction, and more 
deservingness in the former condition. In another experiment, Gollwitzer et al. (2008) found 
that seeing the offender suffer from fateful harm did not evoke perceptions of deservingness, 
lead to a reduction in anger, or to an increase in satisfaction. 
The present study aims at expanding this line of research. It was designed to test the 
comparative suffering hypothesis and the understanding hypothesis directly against each 
other. More importantly, this study aims to elucidate whether seeing the offender suffer or 
making the offender understand is related to goal achievement. Thus, instead of relying on 
self-reports of participants’ emotional experiences after taking revenge, we will make an 
attempt to elucidate the motivational dynamics underlying vengeful responses to injustice. 
According to a motivational priming model proposed by Förster, Liberman, and Higgins 
(2005), motivational states such as needs, intentions, or goals enhance the accessibility of 
motivation-related concepts (cf. Anderson, 1983; Bruner, 1957; Higgins & King, 1981; Wyer 
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& Srull, 1989), because these concepts are conducive to successful goal-pursuit (e.g., Förster 
& Denzler, 2006; P. Gollwitzer, 1996; P. Gollwitzer & Moskowitz, 1996; Goschke & Kuhl, 
1993; Kruglanski, 1996; Kuhl, 1987; Kuhl & Kazén-Saad, 1988). Hence, accessibility of 
goal-related constructs is increased before goal-fulfillment. What happens to activated 
knowledge after goals have been fulfilled? From a functional point of view (Förster & 
Liberman, 2006; Liberman & Förster, 2005) heightened accessibility of goal-related concepts 
loses its functionality after goal-fulfillment and could even interfere with other unrelated 
goals. Therefore, a reduction or even inhibition of accessibility of motivation-related concepts 
after goal-fulfillment is assumed (e.g., Förster et al., 2005; Liberman & Förster, 2000; Marsh, 
Hicks, & Bink, 1998; Marsh, Hicks, & Bryan, 1999; Zeigarnik, 1927). Note that goal 
fulfillment obviously involves processing goal-related constructs, but nevertheless decreases 
their accessibility instead of increasing it, as would be predicted in models of semantic 
priming.
Denzler, Förster, and Liberman (in press) applied this model to aggression. They 
showed that engaging in vengeful actions has beneficial effects for the avenger. They 
demonstrated that stabbing a voodoo doll (representing the offender) or visualizing revenge 
enhances the latency for detecting aggression-related target words in a lexical decision task 
(LDT). Furthermore, Denzler et al. (in press) were able to show that such vengeful activities 
or visualizations have to be goal-specific: When participants were instructed to take revenge 
against the offender, aggression-related cues became less accessible. However, when they 
were instructed to visualize hitting a punching bag, aggression-related cues became even more 
accessible than before. In these studies, the reduced cognitive accessibility of goal-related 
concepts (i.e., aggression-related target words) was used as an indicator of goal fulfillment 
(cf. Förster et al., 2005; Liberman, Förster, & Higgins, 2007). 
The present study adopts this logic: If a decrease in the cognitive accessibility of 
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aggression-related words indicates goal fulfillment, it is possible to investigate the conditions 
under which such a decrease is in fact observable. If the comparative suffering hypothesis 
(Frijda, 1994) was correct, then the accessibility of aggression-related words should decrease 
irrespective of whether participants make the offender suffer (by taking revenge) or merely 
see the offender suffer (by fateful harm). On the other hand, if the understanding hypothesis 
was correct, then the accessibility of aggression-related words should decrease only when the 
offender signals understanding for his suffering, that is, when he relates his suffering to his 
prior unfair behavior. 
Method 
Sample. The sample consisted of German university students that were recruited in 
classes and on campus. One-hundred and sixteen students from different disciplines 
(excluding psychology) agreed to take part in the experiment. After having been debriefed 
and interviewed, four participants expressed having had doubts about the existence of the 
ostensible other participant. These cases were omitted from further analyses. This reduced the 
sample to N = 112 participants. Women were slightly overrepresented (63%). Ages ranged 
between 19 and 36 (M = 22.0; SD = 3.0 years). 
Procedure. The first part of the study belonged to an unrelated experiment that 
investigated participants’ performance in a stock-market game. This game was administered 
via computer and lasted for approximately 30 minutes. Participants were told that their 
computer was connected to the computer of a second participant in another room, who was 
working on the same task independently. After the final round of the stock-market game, 
participants were informed about the amount of money they made in the stock-market game. 
Additionally, they saw how much money the ostensible other participant made. This amount 
was pre-programmed to be roughly equal to the amount of money the real participant made. 
Then, participants were told that both players would receive a total amount of 10 Euros, 
  
 
ACCEPTED MANUSCRIPT 
 What Makes Revenge Satisfactory?   7 
which should be distributed according to their respective performance in the game. Both 
players were asked to make a proposal how the 10 Euros should be distributed between them. 
The vast majority (N = 103) decided to divide the 10 Euros equally between them and the 
other player (M = 49.4%). Eight participants (7%) proposed to keep more than 75% of the 10 
Euros. Another participant decided to keep only 25% for himself. These nine participants 
were omitted from further analyses. 
Provocation. After participants typed their own proposal into a box, the computer 
screen displayed the ostensible partner’s allocation proposal. The partner proposed to keep 
90% of the money for himself. The computer then calculated the average distribution, which 
left approximately 25% (i.e., 2.50 Euros) for the real participants and 75% for the other 
participant. Similar provocations had been used by Batson, Bowers, Leonard, and Smith 
(2000) and M. Gollwitzer et al. (2008). The experimenter read out the final distribution and 
disbursed the money. 
Lexical Decision Task at time-1. Immediately after they received their money, 
participants were asked to do a “reading speed test”. All instructions were presented on the 
computer screen. Participants were informed that they would be presented a number of letter 
strings for which they had to decide whether they constituted German words or non-words. 
Participants were told to press a marked key on the left side of the keyboard if the letter string 
was a German word, and to press a marked key on the right side of the keyboard if it was not 
a word. Three sets of stimulus words were used, and they were fully adapted from Denzler et 
al. (in press; see also Mussweiler & Förster, 2000). One set consisted of aggression-related 
words such as ANGRIFF (attack), HASS (hatred), and GEWALT (violence). A second set 
consisted of non-aggressive words such as GEBIRGE (mountains), BAUEN (build), or 
KLEID (dress). A third set consisted of non-words such as BELSINKI, SHANKELN, or 
GRUMPF. 
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The first ten trials served as practice trials that included five non-aggressive and five 
non-words; these words were different from those used in the 56 test trials. Test trials 
consisted of 14 aggressive words (seven words, each shown twice), 14 non-aggressive words 
(seven words, each shown twice), and 28 non-words (14 words, each shown twice). Words 
were presented in random order. The number of errors, that is, stimuli that were falsely 
classified as a word or a non-word, was small (M = 2.03; SD = 1.71); however, only correct 
responses were used for subsequent analyses. The mean response latency was M = 746.31 
milliseconds (SD = 166.98) for aggressive words, M = 722.16 (SD = 143.92) for non-
aggressive words, and M = 833.56 (SD = 171.02) for non-words. Two participants were 
omitted from further analyses because they had extremely high latencies (three or more 
standard deviations above the mean). This reduced the dataset to N = 101 cases. 
Revenge versus Fate. After participants had completed the LDT, they were instructed 
that the present experiment would soon be over for them, but that participants in the other 
room (including their ostensible partners) might be asked to stay for another 30 minutes 
(without additional payment) and complete another task, which was described as tedious and 
unpleasant (they would be asked to watch unpleasant pictures and write down what they saw 
on these pictures). In the “fate” condition (n = 24), participants were told that their partners 
had been selected by chance to complete the unpleasant task. All other 77 participants were 
told that they could decide whether their partners should complete the unpleasant task. Thirty-
four per cent (n = 26) made use of this option. These participants constituted the “revenge” 
condition. The remaining 51 participants decided not to take revenge; they constituted the “no 
revenge” condition. 
Understanding. At that point, participants learned that they would now have the 
opportunity to send a short message to the other person. Participants were told that if they 
wanted to do so, they could simply type it into a chat window that opened on the computer 
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screen. Soon after, all participants received a message from their ostensible partner. In the 
“understanding” condition (n = 65), this message read as follows: “Saw that I have to look at 
these gross pictures … well, maybe that’s the price I have to pay for making such an unfair 
distribution proposal.” In the “no understanding” condition (n = 36), this message read as 
follows: “Saw that I have to look at these gross pictures … what a bummer! don’t know why I 
have to do this”. 
Lexical Decision Task at time-2. After messages were exchanged, participants were 
asked to complete the LDT for a second time. The mean response latency was M = 739.24 
milliseconds (SD = 143.15) for aggressive words, M = 698.69 (SD = 146.21) for non-
aggressive words, and M = 783.64 (SD = 167.35) for non-words. No participant had extreme 
latencies this time. Again, the number of errors was small (M = 2.23; SD = 1.84); however, 
only correct responses were used for subsequent analyses. 
Finally, participants were probed for suspicion, thanked and partly debriefed. All 
participants received 5 Euros for their participation in the end. They were asked to leave their 
postal or e-mail address so that full debriefing could be sent to them as soon as the study was 
finished. All participants agreed to leave their e-mail address, and all participants received a 
complete debriefing via e-mail within one week. 
Results 
In a first step, latencies were log-transformed in order to reduce the skewness of the 
resulting distribution (see Fazio, 1990). In a second step, log-transformed latencies for 
aggressive words were subtracted from log-transformed latencies for non-aggressive words. 
Thus, a positive value on the resulting difference variable (which will subsequently be 
referred to as LDT index) indicates that aggressive words are relatively more accessible than 
non-aggressive words. Latencies for non-words were not analyzed. LDT scores were 
submitted to a 3 (fate, revenge, no revenge) × 2 (understanding: yes/no) × 2 (occasion of 
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measurement: after provocation, after exchanging messages) mixed analysis of variance.1 
Mean values are depicted in Figure 1. LDT scores did not differ between experimental 
conditions at time-1 (p ≥ .35). The only significant effect was the three-way interaction 
between occasion of measurement, revenge vs. fate, and understanding (F[2,95] = 3.61, p = 
.03, 2pη = .07). The main effects of revenge, understanding, and occasion of measurement 
were non-significant (p’s ≥ .68); neither were the three two-way interactions (p’s ≥ .15). In 
order to facilitate the interpretation of the three-way interaction, we tested the two-way 
interaction between occasion of measurement and understanding for each condition on the 
revenge factor (that is, revenge, no revenge, and fate), separately. 
The two-way interaction between occasion of measurement and understanding was only 
significant in the revenge condition (F[1,24] = 5.69, p = .03, 2pη  = .19). More precisely, LDT 
scores marginally significantly decreased among avengers who received an understanding 
message (t[12] = 1.84; p = .09; d’ = 0.51). On the other hand, LDT scores increased among 
avengers who received a no-understanding message (t[12] = −1.53; p = .15; d’ = 0.42), 
although this latter effect was non-significant. 
The two-way interaction between occasion of measurement and understanding was 
neither significant in the no revenge condition (F[1,49] = 2.12, p = .15, 2pη  = .04) nor in the 
fate condition (F[1,22] = 2.04, p = .17, 2pη  = .09). Thus, among non-avengers and among 
those who learned that the offender would suffer from fate, the relative accessibility of 
aggression-related words did neither increase nor decrease. 
Discussion 
What is the goal of revenge and what makes revenge satisfactory? According to the 
“comparative suffering” hypothesis (Frijda, 1994; Heider, 1958), the goal of revenge is 
fulfilled as soon as the offender suffers at least to an equal degree as the victim had suffered 
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him- or herself from the offender’s unfair behavior. According to the “understanding” 
hypothesis (French, 2001; M. Gollwitzer, in press; Miller, 2001; Vidmar, 2001), however, the 
goal of revenge is fulfilled if the offender understood why revenge was taken on him. More 
precisely, the offender has to signal that he realizes that the penalty is visited on him because 
he behaved unjustly and in virtue of the wrongness of his unjust behavior (Nozick, 1981). 
The main dependent variable in this research was an indirect measure of goal 
fulfillment, which is based on the notion that goal-related concepts become less cognitively 
accessible after the goal is fulfilled (Förster et al., 2005; Förster & Liberman, 2006; Liberman 
et al., 2007). Goal-related concepts were words that are associated with aggression (cf. 
Denzler et al., in press). 
The findings from our study suggest that seeing the offender suffer from fate does not 
seem to be related to goal fulfillment. Thus, the comparative suffering hypothesis was not 
supported. Second, a decrease in LDT scores was only observable when participants took 
revenge and when the offender signaled understanding for this response. This corroborates 
the understanding hypothesis. When avengers received a message in which the offender did 
not seem to understand why revenge was taken on him, LDT scores even increased, although 
this increase was not statistically reliable. This pattern of results is in line with earlier findings 
in which the understanding hypothesis received more support than the comparative suffering 
hypothesis (M. Gollwitzer et al., 2008). 
The present study aimed to provide more insight into the motivational dynamics of 
taking revenge, and the conditions under which the goals of revenge are fulfilled. Our 
findings suggest that the goal of delivering a message to the offender is more important for 
avengers than merely seeing the offender suffer. Before discussing the implications of these 
findings on a broader level, it seems worthwhile to discuss some potential limiting factors of 
the study’s design. 
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First, the most critical factor of the present study is that taking revenge vs. not taking 
revenge was not experimentally manipulated; rather, participants decided for themselves 
whether or not they would take revenge. The quasi-experimental nature of this factor 
principally weakens the internal validity of our design. One might argue that preexisting 
interindividual differences might account for the obtained effects. For example, if people 
scoring high on trait-anger (Spielberger et al., 1985) were more likely to take revenge than 
people scoring low on trait-anger, then all effects including a difference between avengers and 
non-avengers could alternatively interpreted as differences between more vs. less anger-prone 
people. Revenge would have no causal role in this case. Previous research, however, 
disqualifies the notion that the likelihood of taking revenge is primarily a function of a 
person’s personality: M. Gollwitzer et al. (2008) found that avengers and non-avengers did 
not differ on a large number of justice- and anger-related personality measures. In line with 
that argument, Gollwitzer (2007) found that the decision of taking vs. not taking revenge is 
more likely a function of contextual characteristics (e.g., the perceived likelihood that justice 
can be effectively reestablished) than a function of stable interindividual differences. 
Furthermore, one might argue that avengers differ from non-avengers with regard to 
emotional experiences (e.g., the amount of anger and moral outrage) towards the provocation. 
This might be true, but it does not weaken the reliability of our findings. First, we found that 
LDT scores did not differ significantly between avengers, non-avengers, and participants in 
the fate condition at time-1. Second, even if such differences were present, they would not 
necessarily affect any changes in LDT scores between time-1 and time-2. Thus, we are 
confident that neither personality-related nor affective differences between avengers and non-
avengers can plausibly account for the effects that we obtained. 
A second methodological issue is related to the understanding manipulation. The two 
messages were supposed to differ from each other only with regard to how much the offender 
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acknowledged that punishment would be a response to his prior unfair behavior. However, 
what a message objectively contains does not necessarily predict how the message is received 
(Schmitt, Gollwitzer, Förster, & Montada, 2004). In the present study, we did not include a 
manipulation check for testing the construct validity of our understanding manipulation. 
Previous studies, however, suggest that the manipulation was effective (M. Gollwitzer et al., 
2008): Participants who received the understanding message reported that the offender 
admitted his fault; other elements which might be part of a “full apology”, however, were not 
present from participants’ point of view. The understanding messages did not convey a 
statement of remorse, nor a promise to behave better in the future, nor an offer for 
compensating the victim. The offender simply constructed a relation between his or her prior 
behavior and his or her punishment. Obviously, this “minimal understanding” was effective 
and sufficient: It decreased it relative accessibility to aggression-related words among 
avengers in this condition. In other words: The goal of revenge was fulfilled as soon as the 
offender understood why he or she has been punished. A full apology is not necessary here. 
On a broader level, our findings corroborate the notion that revenge aims at delivering a 
message between the victim/avenger and the offender, and that revenge is only effective if 
this message is understood (French, 2001). In other words, revenge is not a goal in itself, but 
rather a means to achieve a higher-order goal (M. Gollwitzer, in press). This notion is not 
new; in fact, it has been put forth by many scholars who addressed the question why people 
take revenge. Fritz Heider (1958) spoke of revenge as a way to exert behavior control over the 
offender, to change his “belief-attitude structure” (p. 267). On a societal level, one important 
function of vengeful behavior between groups is to prevent or avoid future harm by 
suggesting that one has the will and the power to retaliate swiftly (cf. Chagnon, 1988; 
Marongiu & Newman, 1987). The message of revenge in that kind would be something like 
“Never do this again to me”. Understanding this message requires that the targets of revenge 
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understand why revenge was imposed upon them; thus, understanding in the sense of relating 
the vengeful response to one’s prior unfair behavior is a minimal condition, a prerequisite for 
delivering the message effectively (Miller, 2001). 
The notion that revenge is a means to achieve a higher-order goal is furthermore 
consistent with action-theoretical approaches to aggressive behavior (e.g., Montada, 2007; 
Tedeschi & Felson, 1994). Most aggressive behaviors aim at achieving higher-order goals 
(such as demonstrating power, influencing others, asserting and defending social identities, 
reestablishing justice etc.; see also Bushman & Anderson, 2001; M. Gollwitzer, 2007). 
Finally, research on laypersons’ attitudes toward punitive sanctions for criminal offenses 
likewise suggests that punishment usually serves a multitude of higher-order goals (Darley & 
Pittman, 2003; Orth, 2003; Oswald, Hupfeld, Klug, & Gabriel, 2002; Robinson & Darley, 
1995). For all these goals or functions to be effective, it is important that the offender actually 
gets the message: Revenge, aggression, punishment is imposed upon him or her as a response 
to his or her prior unfair behavior. To what extent, however, a simple understanding message 
is sufficient in reducing negative feelings among victims of violent crimes remains an 
empirical question. Recent research in the retributive justice literature (Gromet & Darley, 
2007; Wenzel & Thielmann, 2007) suggests that punishment forms that allow for a direct 
communication between the victim and the offender (such as restorative practices; cf. 
Braithwaite, 1989) are sometimes preferred over more traditional forms of punishment (such 
as incarceration). Future research should address the question under which circumstances 
(e.g., qualitative or quantitative differences in unfair behavior) a simple understanding 
message is sufficient for enhancing victims’ perception that justice has been reestablished and 
that the goal of revenge has been fulfilled. The present study has made a first attempt to show 
that at least in the context of minor transgressions, revenge is satisfactory when the message 
has been effectively delivered. 
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Footnote 
1
 Results were the same in a covariance analysis in which LDT scores at time-2 was the 
dependent variable and LDT scores at time-1 were entered as a covariate: The main effect of 
revenge vs. fate remained significant in this model (p = .005). We decided to report the results 
of the mixed model since mean scores are much better interpretable. 
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Figure Caption 
Figure 1: Relative accessibility to aggression-related words compared to non-aggressive 
words (LDT scores) by experimental conditions and occasions of measurement. Vertical lines 
denote standard errors of means. 
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